These are the Supreme Court cases we cite on this site and in our posts. For each one you will find its citation, what the Court actually decided, and a link to the official opinion at the Library of Congress, opened to the page. Read them yourself.
We keep two things apart. What the Court held is the law. Why we cite a case is our argument, and we label it that way. Where a case is narrower than people sometimes say, we tell you.
How to read a citation: Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) means volume 530 of the United States Reports, beginning at page 57, decided in 2000. “At 65” points to the page where the words appear.
The right to raise your children
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
Opinion of the Court by Justice McReynolds.
What the Court held. Nebraska convicted a teacher for teaching German to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. The Court reversed. The law was arbitrary and violated the liberty the Fourteenth Amendment protects, which includes the teacher’s right to teach and the parents’ right to hire him to teach their children (at 400, 403).
In its words. The liberty protected includes the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” (at 399).
Why we cite it. One of the first cases to say that the liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment includes bringing up your children.
Keep in mind. A criminal case about a teacher, not a custody case. The Court asked whether the law was arbitrary or unreasonable (at 403), not the strict test described in Glucksberg, below. It left in place the State’s power to require school attendance and set the curriculum of its own schools (at 402).
What the Court held. Oregon required children ages 8 to 16 to attend public school. Two private schools sued. The Court held that the law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control” (at 534-35), and it affirmed orders blocking the law.
In its words. “The child is not the mere creature of the State” (at 535).
Why we cite it. The foundation for parents’ right to direct their children’s upbringing and education.
Keep in mind. The Court asked whether the law had a reasonable relation to a proper state purpose (at 535), not the strict test described in Glucksberg, below. It said the State may still regulate schools and require children to attend some school (at 534).
5-2. Opinion of the Court by Justice White. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part.
What the Court held. Illinois took an unwed father’s children in a dependency case without any hearing on whether he was a fit parent, because its law presumed unwed fathers unfit. The Court held that he was entitled to a hearing on his fitness before his children were taken (at 649), and that denying him the hearing other parents received violated equal protection (at 658).
In its words. He was “entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him” (at 649).
Why we cite it. A parent’s fitness must be proven at a hearing, not presumed away.
Keep in mind. It requires a hearing. It does not set how much proof is needed. The equal protection part (Part III) was joined by four of the seven Justices who took part (at 658-59). The case was the State against a parent. Applying it to a case between two parents is our argument (see M.L.B., below).
Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Burger, joined by four Justices. Justice Stewart agreed with the result. Three Justices dissented in part.
What the Court held. Georgia let parents admit their minor children to state mental hospitals. The Court held that Georgia’s procedures met due process. It required an independent check by a “neutral factfinder” who can refuse admission, plus periodic review, but said a staff physician can serve as that factfinder and no formal hearing is required (at 606-07).
In its words. The law presumes that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children” (at 602).
Why we cite it. The source of the presumption that parents act in their children’s best interests, which the Troxel plurality relied on (530 U.S. at 68).
Keep in mind. The children lost this case. The presumption can be overcome (at 602), and it applies only absent a finding of neglect or abuse (at 604). The case is about hospital admissions, not custody.
6-3 in the result, with no majority opinion. Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion for four Justices. Justices Souter and Thomas agreed with the result. Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy dissented.
What the Court held. A Washington court ordered more visitation for grandparents than a fit mother wanted and gave her decision no special weight. The Court held that Washington’s visitation statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3), as applied to her, violated her due process right to make decisions about the care, custody and control of her children (at 67, 69-70, 72-73, plurality opinion).
In its words. Parents’ interest in the care, custody and control of their children is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court” (at 65), and “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children” (at 68) (both plurality opinion).
Why we cite it. A Washington case. It recognizes the parental right and the presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests.
Keep in mind. There is no majority opinion. Quotations from the main opinion speak for four Justices. The Court did not decide whether harm to the child must be shown, or exactly how far the parental right reaches (at 73).
9-0 in the result. Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by four Justices. The other four agreed with the result.
What the Court held. Washington’s ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause (at 735). A right to help in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty, because it is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition (at 720-21, 728).
In its words. The Court’s list of rights it has already recognized includes the right “to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children” (at 720). Fundamental rights may not be infringed “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” (at 721, quoting Reno v. Flores).
Why we cite it. It lists parents’ rights among the fundamental liberties, and it states the strict test that protects fundamental liberties. We argue that test applies to parents.
Keep in mind. The right claimed in this case lost. The parent language is part of a list, not a ruling about parents. In Troxel, Justice Thomas pointed out that the opinions recognizing the parental right did not say which test applies (530 U.S. at 80). The case also says a right must be described carefully (at 721).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
7-1. Opinion of the Court by Justice Jackson. Justice Douglas did not take part.
What the Court held. Notice by newspaper was enough for people whose interests or whereabouts could not be found with due diligence (at 317). People with known addresses had to receive at least ordinary mail (at 318).
In its words. Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections” (at 314).
Why we cite it. The basic rule for notice in every kind of court case.
Keep in mind. A bank trust case. The rule is what is reasonable in the circumstances. The Court accepted “reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary” (at 319).
What the Court held. A Texas court let a stepfather adopt a child without notice to the child’s divorced father, whose whereabouts were known. The Court held that this “violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of law” (at 550). A later hearing did not cure it, because it put on the father burdens of proof the other side would have carried (at 551). Only setting the adoption aside and starting over “would have wiped the slate clean” (at 552).
In its words. The chance to be heard must come “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (at 552).
Why we cite it. Notice comes first. A hearing after the fact does not cure its absence when it shifts the burden to the parent.
Keep in mind. An adoption case, not a custody case. It does not address custody orders. Its point about the burden relies on Texas cases about which side carries the burden (at 551).
5-4. Opinion of the Court by Justice Breyer. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Scalia, and in part by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
What the Court held. A South Carolina family court jailed a father for civil contempt over unpaid child support. He had no lawyer. The Court held that due process does not automatically require a free lawyer in that situation, at least where the other parent has no lawyer either. But the State must use other safeguards, such as notice that ability to pay is the key question, a form to gather financial facts, a chance to respond, and an express finding on ability to pay. He had neither a lawyer nor those safeguards, so jailing him violated due process (at 448-49).
Why we cite it. Family courts can jail parents, and due process applies when they do.
Keep in mind. On the right to a lawyer, the parent lost. The case covers civil contempt only, and it left open cases where the State is owed the support or the case is unusually complex (at 449).
Opinion of the Court by Justice Brennan. Justice Clark dissented. Chief Justice Warren did not take part.
What the Court held. California made people claiming a tax exemption prove they did not advocate violent overthrow of the government. The Court held that where speech is at stake, due process requires the State to carry the burden of persuasion (at 526), and that California’s procedure violated due process (at 529).
In its words. “[W]here the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome” (at 525). The Court repeated this line in Armstrong v. Manzo (380 U.S. at 551).
Why we cite it. Who must prove the case can decide the case. We argue the same is true when the right to raise your children is at stake.
Keep in mind. A free speech case. The Court recognized that placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer is fair “in most circumstances” (at 524-25).
5-4. Opinion of the Court by Justice Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O’Connor.
What the Court held. “Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence” (at 747-48). New York’s “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard violated the Due Process Clause (at 768). States may require more (at 769-70).
Why we cite it. It sets the minimum proof before the State ends a parent’s rights. We argue the same standard should apply before the State interferes with parenting at all.
Keep in mind. A termination case, not a custody case, decided 5-4. The Court required at least clear and convincing evidence, but not proof beyond a reasonable doubt (at 768-69).
6-3. Opinion of the Court by Justice Black. Justices Reed, Burton and Minton dissented.
What the Court held. A Michigan judge acted as a “one-man grand jury,” then tried and convicted two witnesses for contempt arising from that same inquiry. The Court held that this violated due process (at 139).
In its words. “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” (at 136). “[N]o man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome” (at 136).
Why we cite it. The judge who decides a case must not also be part of building it. We argue that principle applies in family court too.
Keep in mind. A criminal contempt case (at 134). Applying it to family court is an analogy, and we present it that way.
6-3. Opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy agreed with the result. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented.
What the Court held. A Mississippi court ended a mother’s parental rights, and the State required her to pay record fees estimated at $2,352.36 before she could appeal (at 106). The Court held that Mississippi may not deny her, “because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent” (at 107), and may not withhold the record she needed for that appeal (at 128).
In its words. “Although the termination proceeding in this case was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M. L. B. resists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-child relationships” (at 116 n.8).
Why we cite it. Our best authority that a family court’s decree is action of the State, even when private parties started the case. That is why we say the Constitution applies in family court.
Keep in mind. The holding is about the right to appeal, and it is limited to decrees ending parental rights. The Court set those apart from “divorce, paternity, and child custody” (at 127). The state action point is in a footnote, and it is about the court’s decree. It does not say that the private people in a case are the State.
6-0. Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Vinson. Justices Reed, Jackson and Rutledge did not take part.
What the Court held. Private agreements that barred people from owning or living in homes because of their race did not, standing alone, violate the Fourteenth Amendment (at 13). But when state courts enforced them, the States denied equal protection of the laws (at 20).
In its words. “[T]he action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment” (at 14).
Why we cite it. Older support for the same point as M.L.B.: a court’s order is action of the State, so the Fourteenth Amendment applies to it.
Keep in mind. A race and property case, not a family case. The Court did not decide the due process question (at 23).
Two older cases appear on our pages only inside quotations from the cases above: Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), quoted in Armstrong v. Manzo, and Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), quoted in Washington v. Glucksberg.
Education, not legal advice. These are general summaries of what the Supreme Court decided. They are not advice about anyone’s case.
